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The mininum  asset tax, with its simple tax codc and nmarginal
impact on the marginial  effective tax rate, is an appealinig  short
cut  to comprehensive  tax reform ---  and  in  Brazil  it could
substantially improve revenue.
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1.  or2acti
In  many countries,  the  proliferation  over time  of often  well-intended
but ad-hoc  tax  incentives  has  created  an opaque  corporate  tax structure  and
led  to many  unanticipated  tax  loopholes.  These  loopholes  are  often  a
significant  source  of revenue  loss  and  create  distortions  in the  allocation  of
resources,  both across  sectors  and  over time.  In recent  years,  tax  authorities
in several  countries  therefore  considered  and  sometimes  actually  introduced
minimum  corporate  taxes.  These  taxes  are  designed  to reduce  both distortions
and  revenue  losses  triggered  by the  unintended  interaction  of  various  credits,
exemptions  and so on.  Liability  under  such  a tax  is sometimes  linked  to
profits,  but more often  to assets,  since  these  are  less  easy to manipulate.  We
will therefore  refer  to such  a tax  as a Minimum  Asset  Tax (MAT).
The  assessment  of a  minimum  tax is  generally  based  on the  computation  of
the  changes  the  minimum  tax  will introduce  in  marginal  effective  tax  rates,  in
line  with the  by now standard  King-Fullerton  methodology.  A/  But this
approach  has in this  particular  instance  severe  limitations.  While  it provides
useful  insights  on the  distortions  corporate  taxes  can  introduce,  it does  not
deal  with the  revenue  effects  of the  loopholes  and, a crucial  point  in this
case,  cannot  handle  uncertainty  at all. This is  a  serious  shortcoming,  since,
as  we will show,  the impact  of minimum  asset  taxes  depends  very much on the
stochastic  characteristics  of the  link  between  assessed  asset  value  and  asset
income  in each  period.
In this  paper  we suggest  an alternative  approach  based  on option
pricing,  an approach  designed  specifically  to incorporate  the impact  of rate
.j/  For  an  overviw of  the xasua1s  raised  by  this  approach  ase  Auerbach  (1990).3
of return  uncertainty  on the  burden  a MAT  will  pose.  The  approach  allows  the
assessment  of the  expected  tax  burden  of a minimum  tax.  It also  yields  a
measure  of  the  value  of  a  minimum  tax  to  a  government  faced  with  a  high  degree
of  uncertainty  about  revenue  prospects  because  of  the  proliferation  of  tax
incentives.
We  exploit  the  similarity  between  the  asymmetries  created  by  minimum
taxes  and  the  asymmetry  that  arises  in  the  link  between  options  and  the
valuation  of  the  asset  on  which  the  options  are  written.  We  show  how  the
addition  of  a  minimum  tax  to  a  standard  corporate  tax  in  effect  grants  the
Government  a  put  option  on  its  share  of  the  business  profits  it  already
obtains  under  the  regular  tax  system.  From  there  on,  standard  option  pricing
methodology  allows  an  assessment  of  the  tax  burden  created  by  a  MAT. We  show
how  the  MAT  burden  is  influenced  by  various  carry-over  rules,  different
depreciation  conventions,  and,  most  importantly,  by  the  degree  of  uncertainty.
We  finish  with  an  assessment  of  the  minimum  asset  tax  recently  considered  in
Brazil,  using  sectoral  information  about  the  stochastic  characteristics  of  the
link  between  asset  values  and  income.
The  remainder  of  -'.'  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides
an  overview  of  the  desig..  if  minimum  taxes.  Section  3  describes  the
application  of  the  option  pricing  approach  to  the  assessment  of  minimum  taxes.
Section  4  shows  the  sensitivity  of  the.  tax  burden  to  rate  of  return
uncertainty  and  to  -various  aspects  of  the  tax  law.  Section  5  applies  the
methodology  to  an  assessment  of  a  recent  Brazilian  MAT  proposal  using  sectoral
data  on  corporate  income  tax  revenue  and  asset  value.  Section  6  concludes.4
2.  The Design  of a  Minimum  Tax  A
A minimum  tax  is  a simple  broad  based  tax,  with no or few  tax
prefereraes. It can  be levied  on income  or on assets,  and  usually  complements
or substitutes  for  a complex,  highly  distortionary,  inequitable  or  widely
avoided  tax.  In fact,  a  minimum  tax  can  have two  different  purposes. £ii.t,
if it complements  or replaces  a tax  with eroding  revenue  (due  to  an abundance
of tax incentives,  or widespread  tax  evasion  and  avoidance  for instance),  it
determines  a minimium  average  tax  rate  for  business  activities.  31 This
reduces  the  government's  uncertainty  regarding  its  revenue  prospects.  Second,
it  may reduce  the  variance  of effective  tax  rates  across  tax  payers  and  assets
by iir  osing  a lower  bound  on the  marginal  effective  tax  rate  faced  by a tax
payer  on  the income  derived  from  any  asset. This  reduces  *ncertainty
regarding  the  allocational  effects  of tax  incentives.  In  most countries  that
have a minimum  tax,  they  are  a complement  to the  corporate  income  tax.  In  a
few,  they  complement  individual  income  taxes.
Minimum  taxes  generally  belong  to  one  of the  following  two  categories:
alternative  taxes  or add-on  taxes.  An add-on  minimum  tax  complements  an
existing  tax.  The  base  of an add-on  tax  could  be book  profits  or assets.  In
general,  it ensures  a minimum  level  of revenue  from  the taxation  of  business
activities  in all  sectors  of the  economy.
An alternative  minimum  tax is  more like  a substitute  for--or  replacement
of--another  tax. It  can take  two  general  forms. In the  first  form,  the  tax
2/  For  a  more  dotailed  overview  of issues  reised  by the design  of minimum  taxes  and for  additional
references,  see  Eetacho  (1990).
.. /  It can  also  result  in an international  redistribution  if the  minimum  tax  is such  that  it reduces
opportunities  for intornational  tax  averaging.5
payer  is required  to  compute  its  tax  liability  under  the  normal  tax  regime  as
well as  under  a  parallel  tax  regime  and then  pays the  larger  amount. The
parallel  regime  can  have either  a simplified  definition  of income  or the
firm's  assets  as a base.  Some  countries  simply  allow  a deduction  of the
minimum  tax  liability  from  the  regular  income  tax  liability.A4  Uader the
second  form,  the  alternative  tax  computed  can  be deducted  from the  regular
income  tax  base rather  than  from  the  tax itseif. For  a given  alternative  tax
base and tax  rate,  this  second  option  will in  general  provide  larger  revenue
to the  government  to the  extent  that  firms  will end  up paying  both taxes--cne
in full,  the  other  one  partially--  rather  than  only  the  highest  one.
Under  either  scheme,  the  rate is typically  set  in such  a  way that,  on average,
only tax  payers  relying  heavily  on tax incentives  end  up paying  a tax  on their
assets.  For  the  other  tax  payers,  only  the income  tax  is relevar".
Of the  99 countries  covered  by the  1989  Price  Waterhouse  survey,  21  use
a  minimum  tax.  Out  of these,  18  have selected  capital  as a  base for  their
minimum  tax.  The  minimum  tax  is an add-on  minimum  tax  on capital  or a firm's
net  worth in 8 countries,  and  an alternative  tax  in the  other  countries.  The
alternative  minimum  taxes  on capital  can  be credited  against  the  income  tax
liability  or can  be counted  as an expense  in the  computation  of the  income  tax
base.  When a firm  has no taxa.ble  profits,  it  ends  up paying  a tax  on capital.
Countries  in this  case include  Austria,  Canada,  Colombia,  Guatemala,  Mexico,
Paraguay  and Switzerland.
. If  the  minimum  tax  liability  is  larger  than  the regular  income  tax liability  and  no provision  is
allowed  to carry  the  difference  forward,  this  case  is  essentially  equivalent  to the  more familiar  case
because  the tax  payer  ends  up paying  the  full  amount  of the  minimum  tax.  The case  is somewhat  different
when  carry  forward  provision  are  allowed,  so that  the  difference  can  be used as a  credit  against  future
corporate  income  tax liabilities.
5/  For a  very  detailed  discussion  of this,  see  Lyon  (1989).6
The rationale  for  an asset  based  minimum  tax  reflects  a combination  of
both revenue  and  administrative  reasons.  In  many countries,  the  identification
of the  income  tax  base is difficult;  but the  direct  taxation  of  business
activities  ha:-  to yield  a minimum  revenue  level  so as to  avoid  political
debates  on the  distribution  of the  tax  burden.  Assets  provide  a simple,
clearly  identifiable  tax  base  for  most firms  with the  exception  of the
financial  sector.  The choice  of assets  as a base  also  minimizes  administrative
costs,  given  that  the  alternative  would  be to single  out  a correct  measure  of
income  in a  jungle  of tax  income  measures  distorted  by tax incentives.
3.  A framework  To Assess  thb .Salue  of Minimum  Taxes
3.1  Introduction
As just shown,  minimum  taxes  are  often  tied  to assets  rather  than income
since,  for  non-financial  firms,  assets  are  much  harder  to  hide or disguise
than income.  A second  reason  for  tying  a minimum  tax  to assets  is  that income
provides  a very  uncertain  tax  base.  from  the  government  point  of view,  income
uncertainty  is  due as  much to the  normal  business  cycle  fluctuations  as it is
due to  uncertainty  about  taxpayers'  use  of tax  incentives  to reduce  taxable
income. Even  if theory  suggests  that income  taxes  should,  in general,  be
preferred  to  asset  based  taxes,  assets-based  taxes  can  provide  a useful  hedge
to governments  against  the  risks  of revenue  shortfalls  due to an intensive  use
of tax  incentives  in th2  income  tax  liability  computations.
To avoid  a situation  in  which  assets  become  the  tax  base as a rule
rather  than  an exception,  the  asset  ba3ed  minimum  tax  should  be designed
carefully.  This  means  that  the  revenue  it is expected  to  yield  and its  effects7
on the  capital  stock  should  principally  depend  on the  revenue  and allocational
effects  of the  income-based  tax.  In  other  words,  the  value  to the  government
of the  minimum  tax  depends  on the  value  the  basic  und rlying  income  tax.  It
does  so in  an asymmetric  manner.  In the  typical  format,  the  minimum  asset  tax
only  comes  in  operation  if the  tax  liability  associated  with the  regular
income  tax  falls  below  a certain  perceettage  of asset  value.
This asymmetry  is similai  to the  asymmetry  in option  contracts  in
financial  markets.  Options  are  securities  whose  values  depend  on those  of
other  more  primitive  securities  or assets.  There  are  two  basic forms  of
options.  A (European)  call  option  grants  its  holder  the  right  to buy an asset
at a specific  date for  a specific  price  ( the  exercise  or strike  price).  A put
option  grants  its  holder  the  right  to sell the  assets  at a specific  date for
the  exercise  or strike  price.  Our approach  to the  evaluation  of an alternative
minimum  tax  on assets  exploits  this  analogy  to option  contracts.§6
Like the  METR (or  King-Fullertorn)  approach,  we take  pre-tax  assets  (A)
and income  (Y)  flows  as exogenous.  Assume  for  simplicity  that  Y  J.A;  - is a
random  productivity  parameter  with a lognormal  distribution  log  . - N (p,  a2).
The  extension  to  a distribution  allowing  for  negative  profits  is trivial  but
not  pursued  here.  t.  is the  rate  at  which  a minimum  tax  is assessed  over the
asset  base of the  corporation.  t,  is  the  standard  corporate  tax  rate.  The
actual  tax  liability  T is the  maximum  cf the  asset  based tax  and  the income
tax:
S./  A few  authors  have  applied  option  theory  to t&x  issues.  Majd and  Myers (1985,  1987)  define  the
government's  right  to tax as  an european  call  option  on each  year's  operating  cash  flows  because  the
government  shares  profits  but  not losses.  Schnabel  and  Roumi  (1990)  view  the government's  tax  claim  as  a
combination  of a call  and  a put  option  writtei.  on the  firm's  pre-tax  value.  The call  option  is associated
with tax  payments  and is  owned  by the  government.  The  put option  is associated  with  tax shields  and is  owned
by the  firm.8
(1)  T - max (tA,tjY
or,  using  Y-7A,
(2)  T  - max (tmA,tr,7A)
Dividing  by A, an expression  for  the  average  tax  rate on assets  obtains:
(3)  T/A  - max (t,,t,7)
- tc7  +  max [(tm-to 7),Io]
To address  the incentive  aspects  of a  minimum  tax, it is also important
to  discuss  the  effects  of this  tax  on the  rate  of return  of the  firm.  The rate
of return  before  taxes  is  defined  as:
(4)  Rbt  - Y/A - y
while  the  after  tax  rate  of return  is:
(5)  Rat  - (Y - max (tmA,tc,A))/A
The latter  can  be rewritten  as:
(6)  Rat  _  - max (t.m,t,-y)
_ X  (l-t 0) - max (tm-tc7,O)
With these  results,  an effective  tax  rate  can  also  be defined:
(7)  METR  - (Rbt  - R.t)/Rbt  - tc  +  max (t 3-t,f,O)/-y
3.2  Option  pricing  and  the  Minimum  Asset  Tax
To clarify  the  link  with options,  consider  a simple  proportional
corporate  profit  tax,  at a rate  t,,  prior  to the  introduction  of a minimum
asset  tax.  Assume,  for  presentational  purposes,  a simple  one  period  set  up,
with assets  A yielding  random  income  Y-7A  before  they  evaporate.  We car  then
write  the  pre-tax  value  of the  corporation,  VT,  as:(8)  VT - tyA
- gl((l-t,)Y  +  tcY)
- VP +  VG
where  Vp is  the  stockmarket  value  of the  firm  and  Vc  the  expected  tax  burden.
gT  is the  expectations  operator  defined  over  the  distribution  of a. (8)
indicates  that  the  state'Q  right  to profit  tax  payments,  valued  at  VG,  is
equivalent  to an equity  participation  by the  state  in  the firm  at rate t,  of
the  total  pre-tax  value.
With  a minimum  asset  tax,  Vp is  reduced  and  VG increased  by the  expected
excess  of minimum  asset  payments  over the  regular  corporate  tax.  Thus,
assuming  profits  materialize  at time  i,  VG becomes:
(9)  VG - (8tCY  +  89nax[(t,A-tcY),OI)e-r
- erit  CY  1  P(tmA,tcY,r,i,a.c,)
where  P(tmA,t,Y,r,i,o)  is the  current  value  of a Rut  option  written  on the
government's  share  in corporate  profits  tCY  with exercise  price  tmA,  for an
interest  rate r,  maturity  i and  standard  deviation  of profits  a.  If '  is
lognormal,  the  pricing  of the  put  can  be done  using  standard  Black-Scholes
option  pricing  formulas.  Thus  the  minimum  asset  tax  can  be seen  as an
enhancement  of the  government's  equity  participation  in the  corporation
through  an option  contract  written  on the  government's  share  in  profits,  a
contract  designed  to  eliminate  downside  risk  for  the  state.
Extensions  to - multi-period  model  are  straightforward  in the  simple
case  of zero intertemporal  cross-correlation  of profits  and in the  absence  of
carry-over  provisions:
(10)  VG - Zi (  e-rit,gy  + P(tmA,tcY,r,i,atc))10
The  multi-period  setting  does  not  change  the  basic  point:  that  the  minimum
asset  tax  a'is a series  of put  options  on the-  firm's  underlying  profits  to the
claims  the  Government  holds  on the  firm  through  its  regular  corporate  tax
claims.  The  value  of those  put  options  cannot  be adequately  assessed  without
explicitly  incorporating  the  variance  of profit  streams.
Practical  aspects  of the  tax  code  lead  to significantly  more  complicated
valuation  problems  than  the  simple  multi-Deriod  example  given  in (10).  The
most important  source  of complication  is the  fact  that  no tax  system  we are
aware  of actually  prov'des  subsidies  when  profits  are  negative.  In the  simple
case  where  tax  cr.-.Its  cannot  be accumulated,  this  leads  to  an additional
option  aspect  of the  tax  code:  in that  case the  corporate  tax itself  is
equivalent  to straight  equity  participation  plui  a put option  with strike
price  zero  written  on the  profits  of the  firm.  However,  since  the  MAT is an
alternative  tax,  the  value  of this  option  is absorbed  into  the  MAT.
Further  conplications  arise  out of the  existence  of carry-over
provisions  with expiration  dates.  This  not only  introduces  the  need  to take
into  account  the stock  of existing  tax  credits  when calculating  corporate  tax
liabilitit3,  but also requires  keeping  track  of the  age  structure  of those
credits.  A  final  complication  arises  when,  as is for  example  the  case in
Mexico,  the  MAT is in fact  a minimum  payment  provision  rather  than  a  minimum
tax.  For  example,  in  Mexico  a MAT  of 2% of assets  is  applied,  but any  excess
of MAT over  corporate  tax  liabilities  can  be carried  over fcr  at most three
years,  to  be applied  against  any  future  excess  of MAT over regular  czrporate
tax  liabilities.  Such  carry-over  provisions  clearly  lower  the  tax  burden,  but
unless  they  are indexed  by the  opportunity  cost  of funds  to the  firm (the11
market  rate of interest),  they  do  not fully  make up for the  state's  failure  to
take  part  of the  losses  as and  when they  occur.
All these  complications  have  an impact  on the  effective  tax  burden
imposed  by the  MAT, but  preclude  full  analytical  expressions  for the
appropriate  pricing  formulas.  We therefore  resort  to simulation  technioues  to
demonstrate  the  increase  in the  tax  burden  imposed  by MATs under  various  tax
structures  and  different  assumptions  about .he  firm's  variability.
4  Monte  Carlo  Evaluation  of the  Minimum  Asset  Tax
In the  first  part  of this  section,  we use the  option  pricing  approach  to
assess  the  MAT  under  a  variety  of different  tax  rules  regarding  depreciation,
carry  forward  provisions,  and  for  different  levels  of uncertainty.  The second
part  of the  paper  applies  the  methodology  to a sample  of Brazilian  firms  from
the  manufacturing  and sservice  sector.  All these  complications  have a
potentially  important  impact  on the  effective  tax  burden  imposed  by the  MAT.
However,  introducing  these  real  world  complications  also  means  that  analytical
solutions  to the  valuation  problem  cannot  be obtained.  We therefore  resort  to
the technique  of  Monte  Carlo  integration  to  solve  the  asset  pricing  equations
involved, nd to demonstrate  the  increase  in  the tax  burden  imposed  by MATs
*nder  various  tax  structures  and  different  assumptions  about  the  firms'
profits  variability.
The random  number  generator  used for  the  Monte  Carlo  integration  is
based  on three  linear  congruential  generators  as suggested  in Press  et alii
(1986),  and  combin.vd  with a shuffle  routine  suggested  by Knuth (1981). This
procedure  was followed  to avoid  the  collapse  in  dimensionality  that  occurs12
with  most standard  random  number  generators,  and  to obtain  the  maximum  cycle
time  available  on 32-bit  PCs.  The  resulting  series  of  uniform  (0,1)  deviates
was transformed  into  normal  deviates  using  the  Box-Muller  method  (cf  Press
e.a. (1986)).  This  process  was repeated  1000  times  for  each  evaluation. The
results  reported  are averages  over  those  runs.
4.1  A Simulation  Model
Assume  a start-up  investment  of size  1 in period  zero,  yielding  revenues
from  period  1 onwards  and  depreciating  exponentially  at a  rate  of 5%  per
annum.  Part  of the  profits  are  devoted  to  reinvestment  so as to  maintain  the
capital  stock  at its  initial  level  of 1.  This is  maintained  during  50  periods,
after  which  what remains  is sold  off,  with the  revenues  added  to the  project's
revenue  stream.  The  project's  annual  gross  real  before  tax  return  has four
components:  (i)  the  expected  net real  rate  of return;  (ii)  a random  term  with
mean  zero  and  positive  variance;  (iii)  the  economic  rate  of depreciation  6
(iv)  an inflation  component.
This  before  tax  rate  of return,  together  with the  stock  of tax
liabilities  carried  over from  earlier  years,  and the  existing  tax  code lead to
a time-dated  series  of corporate  tax  liabilities.  If in any  year these
liabilities  fall  short  of a stipulated  percentage  of asset  value,  the  MAT
kicks in.  MAT liabilities  can  be extinguished  by qual'fying  MAT tax  credits
since  such a  provision  is  usually  included  in the tax  law.  We model the  MAT as
a  minimum  payment  provision--as  it is in  Mexico  for instance,  and include  the
possibility  of MAT  credit  accordingly.13
Depreciation  can  reflect  economic  depreciation  or can follow  the
straight  line  approach  currently  prevailing  in Brazil. This allows  us to show
the  impact  of mismatches  between  econonic  depreciation  and allowed  accounting
methods.  The  marginal  effective  tax  rate is  obtained  from  a  comparison  of the
before  and after  taxes  net  present  value  of the  project. They are  expressed
as a percentage  of the  before  tax  net  present  value  of the  project.
4.2  Simulating  The  Incentive  Effects  of Various  Tax  Designs
Marginal  effective  tax  rates  are  traditionally  computed  ignoring  the
interactions  between  the  design  of the tax  system  and the  degree  of
uncertainty  on the  firm's  profit.  This  section  illustrates,  in  a simple  tax
structure,  the importance  of uncertainty  for  both the  incentive  of fiL.ms  to
invest  and  government  revenue.  For  each simulation,  results  can  be compared
along  two  dimensions:  (i)  with increasing  degrees  of uncertainty  on firms'
returns;  (ii)  with  and  without  a  MAT.
a. The Base  Case
The  base case  reproduces  the  main  features  of Brazil's  corporate  tax
design.  The  corporate  tex (CIT)  rate  is 35%.  2/  Capital  gains  are taxed  at
the  same  rate.  Carry  forward  of losses  for  the  CIT  is allowed  for  4 years.,,
None is  allowed  for the  MAT to  ensure  a  predictable  minimum  tax revenue.  The
2/  In fact,  the  Brazilian  base  rate  is 302  but a 52  surcharge  is due  on large  profits  and the  states  can
levy  a 52 surcharge  on the federal  corporate  tax  liability.
S./  The law  should  require  that  carry  forward  provisions  rules  be designed  to  minimize  the  possibilities
that  firms  do not use  up all  losses  in the  computation  of the  income  tax  in  years  in which  the  MAT is
binding,  waiting  instead  to  use them  up in  years  in  which  losses  can  be used  to minimize  taxable  profits
without being  subject  to the  MAT. One  such  design  would  be to  impose  that losses  be used  in full,
irrespective  of whether  the  MAT  kicks  in.14
taxation  of  business  profits  is also  assumed  to  be protected  from inflation
through  indexation--as  is the  case  in Brazil.  The firm  makes  an investment
with  an exponential  economic  depreciation  of 5% a year  but  must adopt  a
straight  line  depreciation  at the  same  rate.  The  rate  of interest  is assumed
to  be 5%  and the  before  tax  rate of return  is 20%.  Inflation  is  assumed  to be
100%--but  it only  matters  when the  system  is  not fully  indexed  as the  results
below  confirm.  The standard  deviation  of the  rate  of retur:I  is  0 to identify  a
base  with no uncertainty  on profits. Table  1  below  summarizes  the  features  of
the  base case.
Table  1:  Base case  assumptions
Corporate  tax (CIT)  rate  35%
Minimum  asset  tax (MAT)  rate  0%
Depreciation  Method  Straight  Line/5%  a year
Economic  Depreciation  Exponential/5%  a year
Interest  Rate  5%
Before  Tax  Rate of Return  20%
Carry  Forward  of Losses  for  CIT  4 years
Carry  Forw&rd  of Losses  for  MAT  0  years
Annual  Inflation  Level  100%
Standard  Deviation  of Profits  0
Under  these  assumption;,  the  marginal  tax  rate is 32.27%. This is  below
the  statutory  35%  corporate  tax  rate  because  the  net  present  value of
depreciation  allowances  calculated  using  5% straight  line  exceeds  the  net
present  value  of economic  depreciation  if  the  latter  is  exponential  at a rate
of 5%.  Thus  profits  for  tax  purposes  fall  short  of economic  profits,  and  the
effective  tax  rate falls  below the  statutory  rate  accordingly.
Using  this  base case  as benchmark,  we explore  the  impact  of various
changes  in tax  provisions  and  of changes  in intrinsic  uncertainty.  Consider
the latter  first.15
a. Uncertainty  Affects  the Incentive  to invest
Uncertainty  is  measured  by the  standard  de-!ation  of profit  streams
around  the  expected  before  tax  rate  of return. The larger  the  standard
deviation,  the  larger  the  uncertainty. To illustrate  its  importance,  we
calculate  MERTs  for  standard  deviations  varying  between  0 and  8.  These  levels
cover  the  range  of uncertainty  actually  observed  in  Brazil  across  sectors  (cf
section  4.3  below).  All the  other  assumptions  of the  base case  are  maintained,
including  tho  before  tax  rate  of return  of 20%.  Table  2 summarizes  the  result
under  two  tax  systems:  (i)  without  any  minimum  asset  tax  provision,  (ii)  with
a 2%  minimum  tax  on assets.
The first  two  columns  give the  marginal  effective  tax  rate (MERT)
without  and  with the  MAT respectively.  They  measure  the  size  of the
intertemporal  distortions  due  to the tax  system--how  much the tax  system
reduces  the incentive  to invest.  The  third  column  indicates  the  revenue  level
without  MAT,  for  each  degree  of uncertainty.  The fourth  column  gives  the
absolute  revenue  yield  of the  introduction  of a  minimum  tax,  again  for  every
level  of  uncertainty.  The fifth  column  gives  the  percentage  increase  in
revenue  due to the  introduction  of the  minimum  tax,  The last  one  expresses  the
increase  in  MERT  per  unit of increase  in  revenue,  to indicate  how  much each
extra  dollar  of revenue  costs  in terms  of increased  tax  wedge.16
Table 2: Incentive  and  Revenue  effects  of a  MAT  Under  Uncertain
Rate  No  2%  MAT  Tax  Absolute Relative  Increased
of re-  MAT  MERT  Revenue  Revenue  Revenue  MERT per
turn  MERT  Without  Gain (*) Gai.n  unit of
uncer-  MAT  due  due  Revenue
tainty  to  MAT  to  MAT  to  MAT
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
0.0  32.3%  32.27%  1.2065  0  0  0
0.1  32.3%  32.45%  1.2078  0.0065  0.5%  26.6%
0.5  37.10%  39.05%  1.3931  0.0731  5.3%  26.7%
0.8  44.59%  46.86%  1.6787  0.0855  5.1%  26.5%
1  50.13%  52.50%  1.8909  0.0893  4.7%  26.5%
3  108.93%  111.53%  4.1815  0.0995  2.4%  26.1%
5  167.01%  169.61%  6.5224  0.1015  1.6%  25.6%
8  250.83%  253.38%  10.0468  0.1025  1.0%  24.9%
*  The  revenue  gain  from  the introduction  of a  MAT is the  difference  between  the  net present  value
of after  tax cash  flows  from  a  unitary  investment  after  tax with  and  without  MAT  for each  level  of
uncertainty.
Without  uncertainty--and  with positive  profits--,  the  MAT option  is
never  exercised,  so  with and  without  MAT  MERTs  are the  same.  With low
uncertainty--say  a standard  deviation  of 0.1--,  a 2% minimum  tax  does  not
matter  much either,  because  the  spread  around  the  20%  rate  of return  still
leads  to enough  taxable  profits  for the  MAT  not to come into  play.  Of course,
the  lower  the  average  rate  of return,  the  more likely  it is that  a given  MAT
provisions  will  become  binding.  Hence,  the lower  the  average  rate  of return,
the  more  valuable  the  MAT option.  For  instance,  assuming  a  before  tax  rate  of
return  of 10% instead  of 20%  would  allow  the  MAT to kick in  much earlier.  In
that  case,  for  a standard  deviation  of 0.1, the  MERT is 26.75%  without  MAT and
28.28%  with  MAT. Of course  this  claim  assumes  that  the  MAT rate  remains  the
same  as expected  rate  of returns  are lowered.17
As uncertainty  increases,  five  characteristics  emerge.  First,  within
a tax  regime--i.e.  down a column--,  the  marginal  tax  rate increases  with
uncertainty,  even  without  a MAT, and  in fact  quite  dramatically  so.  For
instance,  for  a standard  deviation  of 0.5, the  MERT  without  a MAT is already  5
percentage  points  larger  than  without  uncertainty. This is  due to the  fact
that the  Government,  while  taking  its  share  of profits,  does  not share  in the
losses,  since  firms  receive  no subsidies  through  the  corporate  tax  when
profits  turn  negative.
The  downside  risk insurance  that the  Government  receives  due to the
failure  to  provide  for losses  essentially  gives  the  Government  a put option  in
addition  to the  equity  participation  implicit  in the  corporate  tax  system.21
It is this  put  option  that increases  in  value  when uncertainty  goes  up.  As
uncertainty  increases,  years  with losses  become  more frequent,  and  the losses
larger.  As a result,  the  value  of this  put option  and the  down side  risk
insurance  it  provides  increase,  and so  does,  therefore,  the  MERT.
An important  implication  of this  result  is that  ignoring  the  role  of
uncertainty,  as is done  in standard  applications  of the  King-Fullerton
approach  to compute  MERTs,  leads  to underestimates  of the  disincentive  effects
of corporate  taxation.  This effect  may  be part of the  explanation  of  why the
wave  of Latin  American  tax  reforms  triggered  by the  US 1986 tax  reform  act  has
to date failed  to generate  strong  positive  incentive  effects:  due to the  debt
crisis,  and, in some  places,  incoherent  macroeconomic  policies,  uncertainty
increased  as tax rates  were lowered  and  tax  systems  streamlined.
/  Of course  equity  participation  coupled  with  a put  option  to  insure  against  downward  risk  is equivalent
to a call option; this is the way Majd  and Myers  (1987) present the corporate  tax.18
Second,  the  third  column  shows  that  revenue--i.e.  the  average  tax
rate--increases  with  uncertainty.  This is  due to the  increased  value of the
put option:  with larger  swings  the  Government  earns  more  on the  larger  up
swings,  but  because  of the  put  option  it owns through  the  failure  to provide
for loss  sharing,  it is  protected  against  the  larger  downswings.
Third,  at least  for the  stochastic  process  chosen  for  y, in  any
sector  with large  rate  of return  uncertainty  the  standard  2% minimum  tax  seems
a less  important  determinant  of the  MERT than  uncertainty  itself.  In  other
words,  the  MERT increases  much faster  with the  degree  of uncertainty  than  with
the  introduction  of a  MAT. This  observation  could  provide  an endorsement  for
the  introduction  of a  minimum  tax  in countries  where  profit  uncertainty
reflects  macroeconomic  uncertainty  due  to fiscal  imbalance.  If  a minimum  tax
can  contribute  significantly  to the  reduction  of a fiscal  deficit  it thereby
reduces  uncertainty  about  future  rate  of returns. In  that  case,  the iLitial
increase  in  MERT  due to the introduction  of the  MAT could  very  well  be offset
later  on  by the favorable  impact  of  higher  tax  revenues  on the  degree  of
uncertainty  and  from there  on the  MERT.
Fourth,  the  revenue  effect  of the  introduction  of a minimum  tax
follows  a rather  particular  pattern. Revenue  gains  first  increase  with
uncertainty  quite  steeply.  But  once  uncertainty  reaches  0.5, the  marginal
revenue  effect  of the  MAT starts  to flatten  out; although  higher  uncertainty
still  brings  higher  revenue  gains  from  the  MAT, it  does so at an increasingly
slower  rate.  This is probably  at least  in  part a consequence  of the
particular  stochastic  process  underlying  asset  returns:  since  the  marginal
impact  of a  MAT really  is  proportional  to the  difference  between  two  put
options  (the  one  embedded  in the  regular  tax  structure  and  the  one19
representing  the  down  side  risk  insurance  provided  through  the  MAT),  there  is
no a priori  presumption  on the  rate  at  which the  marginal  impact  of the  MAT
should  respond  to  higher  uncertainty.  We find  it to  be a declining  rate.
Fifth,  it remains  true  however,  that  the  increase  in  MERT an
introduction  of the  MAT leads  to is  higher  at higher  levels  of uncertainty.
This  establishes  a  presumption  that  the  MAT tends  to  penalize  high risk firms
more than  low  risk firms  for  given  rate  of return.  However  un  standard
asset  pricing  principles  one  would  expect  high risk  firms  also to  offer  higher
average  rate  of returns;  since  the  latter  tend to  diminish  the  impact  of a  MAT
of a given  rate,  it is  not  necessarily  true  that  a MAT  unduly  falls  on high
risk  firms. This is in the  end  an empirical  matter,  to  which  we return  in  our
analysis  of the  Brazilian  data (cf  Section  4.3).
b.  Loss  Carry-Forward  Provisions  and  Uncertainty
The  previous  section  shows  that  minimum  taxes  are likely  to  penalize
new  firms  facing  a  high degree  of uncertainty  on their  profits. This effect
can  to some  extent  be offset  by allowing  losses  to be carried  forward,  to  be
applied  against  taxable  income  in  periods  where  the latter  is  positive.
However  carry-forward  provisions  are  no substitute  for full  loss  provision
unless  there  is  no limit  on the  number  of years  losses  can  be carried  forward
and  unless  they  are indexed  by the  nominal  interest  rate. 101  Table  3 shows
that  in  an uncertain  world,  as illustrated  by a standard  deviation  of 1, the
lower  the  number  of years  losses  can  be carried  forward,  the  higher  the
effective  tax  rate.  Granting  infinite  carry  forward--or  50 years,  which is  as
IO/  A recent  overview  of  the  issues  raised  by  tax  losses  is  found  in  Mintz,  J.  (1989).20
close  as we can get  to infinity  in this  50  period  model--  will cut the
effective  tax rate,  at that  level  of uncertainty,  from  the  current  50.1%  to
44.21%.  The cost in terms  of revenue  is  however  large  as revenue  fal.s  to
about  88.2%  of its  current  level.
Table 3: Incentive  and  Revenue  Effects  of Carry  Forward  Provisions
(for  a standard  deviation  of 1)
years  BASE  Revenue  2%  Revenue  5%  Revenue
of  MERT  as  %  MAT  as % of  MAT  as  %
Carry  current  MERT  current  MERT  current
Forward
4  50.1%  100%  52.5%  104.7%  56.1%  111.9%
10  44.7%  89.2%  47.2%  94.2%  51.0%  101.7%
50  44.2%  88.2%  46.7%  93.2%  50.5%  100.7%
The introduction  of a 2%  minimum  asset  tax  would reduce  the loss  by
maintaining  revenue  at 93.2%  of  its  current  level.  This  suggest  that the
efficiency  costs  of a  minimum  tax  can  be offset  by a extension  of the  carry
forward  provision  length.  However,  to  ensure  that  the  revenue  objectives  of
the  tax  are  met, the  MAT rate  needs  to  be adjusted  as  well. For  a 50  years
carry  forward  period,  a 5%  MAT  would  do the  job in terms  of revenue  but it
would  do so  by offsetting  the  effect  on the  MERT  of the  increase  in the
carryforward  provision.  On the  other  hand, for  a 4 year carry  forward  period
of  4 years,  by adopting  a 5%  minimum  tax  on assets,  the  government  could
increase  its  revenue  by almost  11%.  This  would  be achieved  at the  cost of an
increase  in  MERT to 56.1%.  A major  difference  between  the two  tax  designs
however,  is that the  high-MAT/long-carry-forward-period  design  reduces  the
distortions  against  risk takers  implied  by the  limit  on the  carry  forward
provision  in the  other  tax  set  up.
Throughout  we have assumed  that  there  was  no carry  forward  provision
under  the  MAT itself.  But in  some countries,  payments  under  the  MAT in excess
of regular  corporate  tax  liabilities  can also  be carried  forward,  to be
applied  against  tax  liabilities  in  excess  of the  MAT in years  where  that
situation  actually  occurs. For  example  Mexico's  MAT allows  for  three  years  of
carry-over  of excess  MAT payments  (and  five  years  of carry  over of regular
losses  under  the  straight  corporate  tax  law).21
Table  4: ffects of Carry  Forward  Provisions  for  Excess  MAT Paments
(for  a standard  deviation  of 1)
years  MAT  MERT  Revenue
of  as %
Carry  current
Forward
0  0.02  52.50%  104.7%
5  0.92  51.19%  102.1%
20  0.02  50.17%  101.2%
NA  0.0  50.13%  100%
The table  makes  clear  that  as  MAT carry-over  periods  lengthen,  the  MERT
converges  back to its  no-MAT  value.  Thus  with sufficiently  long  carry-over
provisions  for  excess  payments  under  MAT, the  MAT acts  more  as a tax  smoothing
device  rather  than  a real  minimum  tax.  For  that  reason  a MAT  with long  carry-
over  periods  allowed  is  better  seen  as a  minimum  Rayment  device  rather  than  a
minimum  tax  device.
c.  Depreciation  Method
The standard  dep-csiation  method  in Brazil's  tax  system  is straight  line
depreciation.  Economic  depreciation  is  assumed  to follow  an exponential  path
in  the  base  case,  although  at the  same  rate  as the  Straight  Line  schedule.
Thus  economic  depreciation  always  falls  short  of accounting  or tax
depreciation:  while  the  rate is  the  same,  under  exponential  depreciation  the
base over  which  this  rate  gets  applied  shrinks  over time. As a consequence,
the  effective  tax  rate  decreases,  as the  tax  base gets  eroded  by what
increasingly  amounts  to an accelerated  depreciation  provision.  Table 5 shows,
for  an uncertainty  level  of 1, that  the  distortion  is significant  at about
1.1%  and  that it  benefits  the  firm. Revenue  is  however  lower  under  the
current  system  than it  could  be without  the  accelerated  depreciation  allowance
implicit  in the  straight  line  schedule.22
Table  5: Straight  Line  vs.  Exponent 4al Depgeciation
Depreciation  Uncertainty  No MAT  2% MAT  Revenue
Method  Allowed  Level  MERT  MERT  Gain
Straight  Line  1  50.1%  52.5%  4.7%
Exponential  1  51.2%  54.3%  3.8%
The  minimum  tax  overcorrects  for  the  disto'tion.  Under  the  current
system,  the introduction  of the  minimum  tax  leads  to a  MERT of 52.5%  vs a MERT
of 54.3%  that  would  prevail  if legal  depreciation  were to match  economic
depreciation.  It also  leads  to  a significant  revenue  increase  as revenue
collected  with a  minimum  tax  is  4.7% larger  if straight  line  depreciation
prevails  and 3.8%  larger  if  exponential  depreciation  prevails  in the  law.
4.3  The Lessons  for  Brazil
The  analysis  of this  section  is  based  on an extensive  sample  of firms  in
Brazilian  manufacturing  and services.  For  each  of 35 subsectors  (cf  Table  6
for  details),  the  50 corporations  with the  largest  sales  revenue  are
identified.  For  each firm,  the  ratio  of before  tax  profits  to assets  value  is
computed.  The  average  rate  of return  per sector  and  the  standard  deviation  for
each  one  of the  sectors  is  based  on this 50 firms  sample.
The  average  standard  deviation  accross  subsectors  is 0.70  but in the
sample  it  ranges  from  0.19 for  the  non-metal  industries  to 11.02  for  the
Assistance  Services.  Graph  1 shows  for  1989  that there  is a strong  positive
correlation  between  the  rate  of retrun  and the  standard  deviation. The larger
the  standard  deviation,  a proxy  for  risk involved  in the sector,  the  larger
the  average  return.  Table  6 summarizes  the  main results  of the  simulations.23
The  average  before  tax  rate  of return  is 48%  but  with  a wide spread,  going
from  2% for  Cooperatives  to  401% for  the  "Assistance  Services"  subsector.
The  unweighted  average  revenue  gain  from  the  minimum  tax  would  be
around  3% of current  corporate  tax  revenue.- 11 This  number  is  however  likely
to  be a substantial  underestimate  for  a variety  of reasons. First,  the  model
does  not  exhaustively  account  for  all -he  fiscal  incentives  allowed  by the
Brazilian  law;  the  data  to do that  are  simply  not  available.  It compares
revenue  under  a straight  corporate  income  tax  and  revenue  under  an asset  tax.
If incentives  take the  form  of a reduction  in profits  for tax  purposes,  it
would  be reflected  in  the  data.  But if they  take  the  form  of rates  reduction
or tax liability  cuts,  they  are  not  picked  up.  The results  thus  tend  to
overestimate  average  tax  rates  and  hence  revenue  in the  base case.  Second,  we
do not  know tl  distribution  of assets  between  short  and long  lived;  we have
assumed  that  all  are long  term  lived.  In Brazil,  short  lived  assets  face lov,er
effective  anid  average  tax  rates,  so  by assuming  all  assets  to  be long  li'red,
we overestimate  income  tax  liabilities.  Third,  and  perhaps  more importantly,
the  revenue  gains  are  unweighted. Calculating  a  weighted  average  is
unfortunately  not  possible  since  we do not  have  output  data  for  each sector  on
a matching  sectoral  definition.  Many of the  sectors  where  the  gains  from  a  MAT
could  be significant  have  a large  relative  share  of production  in the  economy
and  should  be large  tax  payers  under  the  current  regime.
jl/  This  assumes  that  the federal  government  can  tax  all  non-monetary  assets.  This  is however  not the
caso  currently  in Brazil.  Resl  Estate  (land  and  buildings)  is  taxed  by municipalities  and  vehicles  are  taxed
by the statos).24
Table  6:  Minimum  Rovenue  Gains  from  a  MAT in  Brazil
§  . :  ~~~~~plof  btl  |  td  mmB  . w  amk  &"aB  tqt  IV tl  XZ  EFFCY
l~~~~~~~~~o  dov  o Kas  .~V  M2  Do  "a  -1-M  'M  C  ==OST
Minerals  *xtr.  0.09  0.37  0.4263  0.4771  1.7426  0.9998  0.9112  11.9Z  0.6
Non-metal  indu  0.18  0.19  0.3235  0.3345  3.3796  2.2882  2.2493  3.42  0.3
Steel  0.14  0.  6  0.5366  0.5711  2.6701  1.2372  1.1451  6.42  0 4
Mechanic  0.41  1.59  0.4506  0.4617  7.6252  4.1881  ... 1043  2.4X  0.1
Transport  Equip.  0.89  4.76  0.539  0.5444  16.4939  7.6031  7.5141  1.02  0.1
Wood  0.11  0.37  0.3b5  0.4347  2.1077  1.2752  1.L914  10.12  0.5
Furniture  1.44  7.30  0.5282  0.531  26.6221  12.5598  12.4710  0.6S  0.0
Rubber  0.27  0.37  0.3385  0,3479  5.0287  3.3268  3.2791  2.82  0.2
Leather  0.13  0.21  0.3252  0.3493  2.4675  i.665  1.6055  7.41  0.4
Chemicals  0,74  3,98  0.5397  0.5462  13.7205  6.3198  6.2306  1.22  0.1
Pharmaceutical  0.30  2.01  0.6073  0.6238  5.6311  2.2112  2.1183  2.7Z  0.2
Plztica  0.43  2.2  0.5201  0.5312  8.0107  3.8445  3.7558  2.12  0.1
Textilo  0.35  1.48  0.4679  0.481  6.5262  3.4729  3.3873  2.82  0.2
Clothing  b  Textile  1.26  4.98  0.4806  0.4846  21.4303  11.1313  11.0462  0.82  0.0
Food Products  0.13  0.22  0.3276  0.3525  2.4678  1.6594  1.598  7.62  0.4
Beverages  0.16  0.26  0.3323  0.3516  3.0168  2.0144  1.9561  5.82  0.3
Graphics  0.39  3.32  0.7185  0.7315  7.3170  2.06  1.9648  1.82  0.1
Other Industry  0.19  0.49  0.3733  0.3941  3.5722  2 2387  2.1644  5.62  0.3
Shoes  0.09  0.5  0.5065  0.5596  1.7469  0.8621  0.7693  10.52  0.6
Construction  0.88  2.6  0.4264  0.4313  16.2492  9.3202  9.2412  1.12  0.1
Public  Utilities  0.02  0.4  1.0952  1.3184  0.4657  -0.0443  -0.1483  20.4Z  2.1
Coemm ications  0.83  2.24  0.3975  0.4022  15.3144  9.2276  9.1546  1.22  0.1
Repairs  0.79  4.07  0.5271  0.5331  14.6453  5.9262  6.8377  1.12  0.1
Personal  Serv. (1)  0.25  0.32  0.3351  0.3447  4.6629  3.0995  3.055  2.82  0.2
Radio-TV  0.20  0.3  0.335  0.3492  3.7484  2.4929  2.4396  4.22  0.3
Other  Services  4.01  11.2  0.4063  0.4073  73.6674  43.7334  43.6599  0.22  0.0
Personal  Serv. (2)  0.4  0.61  0.3481  0.355  7.4099  4.8302  4.779  2.02  0.1
Financial  sector  0.25  0.45  0.3485  0.3614  4.6662  3.0401  2.9799  3.72  0.2
Wholesale  trade  0.17  0.25  0.3299  0.3466  3.1991  2.1438  2.0904  5.12  0.3
Retail  trade  0.10  0.34  0.3931  0.437  1.9241  1.1677  1.0832  11.22  0.5
Real Estate  mgt  0.22  0.51  0.3653  0.3823  4.1205  2.6154  2.5451  4.72  0.2
Other  Sorvicos  0.11  0.62  0.5196  0.5633  2.1161  1.0165  0.9242  8.42  0.5
Cooperatives  0.02  0.81  2.0693  2.2863  0.4794  -0.5126  -0.6166  10.52  2.1
Foundations  0.46  0.67  0.3482  0.3539  8.5073  5.545  5.4963  1.62  0.1
Avera e  0.48  1.80  0.50  0.53  8.9  4.87  4.79  5.02  0.35 Standard  Deviation  0.70  2.38  0.31  0.35  12.87  7.45  7.45  0.04  0.47
Such  sectors  include  Industries  of  Public  Utility  (a  gain  of 20.4%),
Mineral  extraction  (11.9%),  Wholesale  Trade (11.2%),  Clothing  and  Shoes
(10.5%),  Food  Products  (7.6%)  or Steel  (6.4%).  Important  sectors  that  would25
hardly  be affected  by the  tax  include  the  Chemical  (1.2%),  Mechanical  (2.4%)
and  Transport  Material  (1%)  industries  as well  as retail  trade  and  the
financial  sector.  While  the  last  two  sectors  are  not really  capital  intensive
and  hence  should  not  be expected  to  be dramatically  affected  by an asset  based
tax,  the  result  is  more  surprising  for  some  of these  industries  where  capital
is  a crucial  factor  of production.
To put  all this  in  perspective,  average  corporate  tax  rates  in  Brazil
range  between  10  and 18%  (between  1981  and 1988),  as opposed  to the  35%  flat
rate  assumed  in  our analysis.  None of the  factors  affecting  our  estimate  of
the  average  corporate  tax  rate  would  affect  the  MAT (in  fact  that is the  point
of a  MAT); thus  the  revenue  gain  from  a  MAT could  easily  be four to five  times
higher  than  suggested  in  Table  6.
A common  argument  to justify
iR  vrmcus  AMwor  Rotsof  Renl  the introduction  of a  minimum  tax is
that  it  can  reduce  intersectoral
3.  /  distortions.  The  Brazilian  simulation
_L_  /  show  that  when assets  are  used  as a
base for  a minimum  tax,  this  does  not
necessarily  hold.  The standard
deviation  of marginal  effective  tax
<.6  o04  o  0.4  oDA  t.2
Log  Stwrd DeaIotTo  rates  increases  from .31  to .35 with
-____________  __  the introduction of a 2% minimum tax.
Figure  1  This  reflects  the  wide  variety  of
capital  intensity  in  modes  of
production  accross  sectors.  The larger  the  capital  intensity,  the  higher  thc
effect  of an asset  based  tax.  This  may  be explained  by the  distortion  the  tax
creates  against  capital  intensive  sectors  as illustrated  by the  following
example.  Minerals  extraction,  the  wood  processing  industry  and the  rubber
industry  face the  same  degree  of uncertainty,  with  a standard  deviation  of
0.37.  The revenue  gain  from  the  minimum  tax  is the  largest  for  the  sector  with
the  lowest  rate of return,  minerals  and  the  lowest  for the  sector  with the
highest  rate  of return,  rubber. Mineral  also  happens  to  be the  more capital
intensive  of the  three  sectors.
The final  result  is  perhaps  the  most interesting  one.  We already  pointed
out that  a higher  variance  raises  th?  impact  of a MAT,  but that  a lower26
expected  rate  of return  leads  to a
smaller  impact  of  a  MAT.  But  a high  rrince  vs Percent  e  Revenue  Increase
variance  will  typically  also  mean
higher  expected  revenue;  s  the  net
effect  of higher  variance  on the
impact  of a MAT is  not clear  a  |  _
priori.  Brazilian  data  suggest  that
the  higher  rate  of return  effect  _  _  _  _
-04.  -0  0  0.4  0.3  1.2
eventually  overtakes  the  direct  LI" Stwd  DtAdo
impact of more uncertainty: the
sectors  with  the  highest  variance  in
fact  face  the  smallest  increase  in  their  MERT  after  an  introduction  of  a  MAT
(Figure  2).  The  reason  becomes  clear  once  we  inspect  the  correlation  between
variance  and  average  rate  of return  (Figure  1):  the figure  indicates  a strong
positive  link  between  the  two,  as one  would  expect  with  risk averse  investors.
5  Conclusions
Four  main  conclusions  emerge  from  this  analysis. First,  uncertainty
needs  to play an explicit  role  in an evaluation  of  MAT  proposals,  and, in
fact,  of corporate  taxation  in general. We provide  several  examples,  well
within  the  parameter  range  of the  Brazilian  data  analyzed  also,  where  the
option  characteristics  of the  corporate  tax  itself  completely  dominate  the
impact  of  the  various  tax  provisions  on  the  MERT  under  full  certainty.  In
particular,  because  of the  absence  of adequately  indexed  carry-over
provisions,  higher  rate  of return  uncertainty  significantly  raises  the  tax
burden  for  given  expected  rate  of  return.
Second,  the  MAT,  with its  simple  tax  code and in the  end  quite  marginal
impact  on  the  MERT, is  an  appealing  short  cut to  a comprehensive  tax  reform.
We suggest  that  the  revenue  effects  could  be substantial  in  Brazil.  This
raises  an intriguing  possibility:  in countries  like  Brazil,  rate  of return
uncertainty  is likely  to be much  more increased  by macroeconomic  uncertainty
than  by the introduction  of  a MAT,  which  in turn traces  back to fiscal
imbalances.  If  a  MAT can  contribute  to  reducing  macroeconomic  uncertainty  by
reducing  fiscal  imbalances,  it  will also  contribute  to lowering  the  MERT27
indirectly  by more than  it  would  raise  it  directly  for  given  starting  level  of
uncertainty.  In sum, in  those  circumstances  the  MAT  could  in fact  lower  rather
than  raise  the  MERTI
The final  conclusion  is that  two  a  priori  plausible  presumptions  in  fact
seem  to  be incorrect,  at least  in the  sample  we looked  at.  First,  because  of
the  high  variance  of capital  intensity  accross  sectors,  the  MAT does  not
reduce  sectoral  distortions;  the  standard  deviation  of the  MERT  with MAT is
higher  than  without.  Second,  although  it is  true  that  high  variance  leads  to a
higher  marginal  impact  of the  MAT, it is  not true  that  high risk firms  tend  to
be hit  harder  by the  MAT.  The  explanation  is that  high-risk  firms  tend  to also
be high rate  of return  firms,  and the  latter  element  reduces  the  impact  of a
MAT.  In our  Brazilian  sample,  the latter  effect  in fact  dominates.  So  a
concern  that  the  MAT  would  discriminate  against  the  most innovative  but
riskiest  firms  seems  unwarranted.
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